1996 Conference on College Composition and Communication
March 29, 1996
Milwaukee, WI
English Department, Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL 60115
(815) 753-1622
dsulliva@niu.edu
"I have given you authority to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy, and nothing shall injure you." Luke 10:19
Atlthough isolated cultic Christian sects have taken the above words spoken by Jesus, and similar ones in Mark 16, as an injunction to handle poisonous snakes, when Jesus told his disciples that he was giving them power over serpents and scorpions, he made it clear that he was referring to demonic powers rather than to members of the animal kingdom. The Apostle Paul wrote that a Christian's struggle is not against flesh and blood, but rather against "spiritual forces of wickedness in the heavenly places" (Ephesians 6:12).
Based on these scriptures, it seems likely that, in the early Church, believers thought of their enemy as a spiritual enemy. Nevertheless, Paul also warned the elders of the Ephesian Church that he expected "savage wolves" to come among the flock after his departure. Furthermore, he prophesied that from their own ranks, false teachers would arise who would draw people away from the true faith by speaking perverse things (Acts 20: 29-30).
A little over a century after Paul's prophesy, Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, wrote an extended treatise, consisting of five books, titled Against Heresies, the purpose of which, he says, is to protect the sheep from certain men who "outwardly are covered with sheep's clothing" (Irenaeus 315). My present interest is the rhetorical strategies employed by Irenaeus in this treatise to distinguish orthodoxy from heresy. Because Against Heresies is quite long, I have restricted my analysis to Book I.
Before analyzing his strategies, however, I think it is important to show that Irenaeus' strategies should be of general interest to rhetoricians. Exhibiting striking similarities to ancient polemics such as Isocrates' Against the Sophists, to a tradition of heresiology texts in the early church by the likes of Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, to modern religious treatises such as Walter R. Martin's The Kingdom of the Cults, and to modern political speechs that focus on the policies of the opposition, Against Heresies is a member of a long-lived rhetorical species, or genre, the primary objective of which is to attack an opposing group by exposing its secrets. My thesis is that effective expose of this type works because, although the words of the other are presenced, they are marked as alien and presented within a hostile context with a disapproving disposition. Furthermore, giving voice to the other is such a risky strategy that the rhetor must insure that the reader, as obsever, recognizes the superiority of the rhetor's position.
One of my assumptions in this paper is that such rhetorical acts are epideictic in nature, an assumption I shall explain presently; however, my objective is not to demonstrate simply that this fossilized text is best catalogued in the museum of rhetorical artifacts under the larger generic category of epideictic. Although such archival work is not to be dismissed lightly, I hope rather to explore the dynamics of what happens when someone picks up a serpent, or, to put it in our own professional jargon, to investigate the rhetorical dimensions of appropriating the words of another with the intention of exposing the absurdity of that person's beliefs.
Rhetorical Expose and Epideictic.
Epideictic rhetoric is, of course, one of the three Aristotelian genres of rhetoric. The descriptions Aristotle gave of deliberative, epideictic, and forensic rhetoric in chapters four, nine, and ten in the first book of his Rhetoric are well known: deliberative is concerned with what is expedient for the future, epideictic with what is praiseworthy in the present, and forensic with what was just or unjust in the past. It is certainly beyond the scope of the present paper to acquaint the reader with the intricate network of theories about epideictic rhetoric, which has been variously characterized as mere display (Black), as a display of virtuosity (Consigny), as a display of legitimacy (Halloran), as display art closely related to literary discourse (Burke 295), as a communion based in shared values (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca), as a celebration of Being (Rosenfield), as educational (Oravec) and philosophical discourse (Duffy), as performative rhetoric (Beale), as ritualistic rhetoric (Carter), and as the rhetoric of orhtodoxies (Sullivan, "Epideictic Rhetoric of Science").
There is, however, in this body of work an implicit distinction between epideictic as charismatic rhetoric and epideictic as bureaucratic rhetoric, with ritualistic rhetoric straddling the divide between them. As charismatic rhetoric, epideictic is a shining forth of Being, an unveilment of truth (Rosenfield). Such rhetoric, rather than being philosophical (Kennedy), epistemic (Scott), or even doxastic (McKerrow), can be described as aletheiac (from the Greek word for truth) (Sullivan, "Kairos"). Conversly, as bureaucratic rhetoric, epideictic draws the boundaries of orthodoxy, maintains hierarcichal relationships, and establishes acceptable practices. In charismatic epideictic, utterances break out unexpectantly and extemporaneously; in bureaucratic rhetoric, discourse is controlled by the forum of discourse and the expectations of the audience.
Regardless of whether we are thinking of epideictic as the rhetoric of control or as the rhetoric of unexpected, inspired utterance, the notion of exposure is an essential element of epideictic. In charismatic epideictic, the sudden unveilment, or exposure, of Being creates a sense of the numinous. Contrarily, in bureaucratized epideictic, expose is the unveiling of the secrets of the heterodox. It is a demystification which disempowers. As Edwin Black puts it, one who conducts an expose, "seeks disclosure of secrets in the belief that such exposure will work to the detriment of whatever is revealed." There is the belief that "the secret, which is simultaneously concealed because it is evil and evil becaue it is concealed, will shrivel in the luminosity of revelation" (136). By demystifying the other, orthodox rhetors keep members of the orthodoxy safe within the fold.
Expose and the Words of the Heterodox.
Now that we have glanced briefly at the relationship between expose and epideictic, I move on to look at the rhetorical dynamics of taking up the words of the heterodox as a weapon against them. This phenomenon appears in a wide range of contexts, from satirical portrayals to prosecutory accusations. Whatever the situation, the rhetor appropriates the words which belong to others, which exist in their mouths, in their contexts, serving their intentions, and makes them his or her own (Bakhtin 294). These words, vehicles for the ideology of a group, take on a different function when contextualized within an expose, as Edwin Black explains:
There is an important distinction between regulating a condition and destroying it, between being initiated into a mystery and having a mystery disclosed. An initiation into a mystery preserves the mystery. The initiate shares the mystery only with a cadre of the elect, sometimes even taking a vow to preserve their monopoly. But the concept of disclosure implies a dissipation of mystery. From an economic standpoint, one could say that an initiation into a mystery preserves the captital; an expose expends the capital. (141)
Although the recontextualization of another's words in an alien and unfriendly context is the point of focus in the present study, recontextualization in general is at the heart of rhetorical presentation. This is true even in very specialized forms of rhetoric such as scientific discourse. As Knorr-Cetina and, later, Berkenkotter and Huckin have shown, it is incumbent upon the scientist to recontextualize scientific findings, taking them from the realm of discovery in the lab and transforming them so that they become part of the research field's intertext. The rhetor, of whatever ilk, is a translater, someone who is able to translate words and experiences from one domain into another. It follows that the rhetor is a medium, one who provides readings of experiences and texts, readings which both reveal and conceal the original (Black 134).
Of particular interest in the present case, however, is the recontextualization which speaks words normally considered malignant in an attempt to inoculate, safely incapsulating heterodox ideas within the hermeneutic perspective provided by orthodoxy. As I said earlier, my thesis is that effective expose of this type works because, although the words of the other are presenced, they are marked as alien, presented within a hostile context with a disapproving disposition, and shown to be inferior to the position of the rhetor. In an extreme case, someone may simply repeat the words of the other without comment, assuming that the sensus communis she shares with the audience will provide sufficient hermeneutic context for exposing the words' absurdity (See Appendix A of Wayne Booth's Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent). In other cases the words are contextualized by introductions which state the rhetor's purpose, thereby alerting the audience to adopt a resisting posture. In other cases, the doctrines of the heterdox are explained in exhaustive detail, punctuated from time to time with ridicule.
St. Irenaeus' Expose of Gnosticism.
Irenaeus was a student of Polycarp, who was a student of St. John the Apostle. He lived ca. 120-202 C.E. During his episcopate, Gnosticism, an early Christian heresy reputed to have started with Simon Magus and drawing heavily upon magic, drug use, and Pythagorean mysticism, had gained so many followers that it could no longer be ignored. Gnosticism was considered heretical because it denied that the creator is the one true God, and because it denied the divine incarnation of Jesus Christ. Irenaeus set out to battle this heresy by exposing its teachings, doctrines to which initiates of Gnosticism would be introduced only incrementally as their commitment became stronger. In so doing, he drew a clear line of demarcation between the contending parties, an act that led to the formation of orthodoxy and heresy as distinct and discernible entities. As Gerard Vallee says, "What Irenaeus achieved . . . was not only the intended refutation, but the lasting polarization of Christian fronts" (11).
Gnostics agreed generally on certain points: matter is corrupt; the true God could not have made matter; if Christ was God, he could not have been fully incarnate as orthodox Christianity taught; there is a Pleroma consisting of thirty Gods, all emanating in gendered couples from the first Aeon; the physical universe was created by a divinity who came into existence because Sophia (the last of the thirty Gods) sought to know the perfect, pre-exitent Aeon, and her longing had to be severed from her in order for her to remain in the Pleroma, thereby creating a divine force outside the Pleroma that was ignorant of the Pleroma. The mythic superstructure is extremely complex, and various sects of Gnosticism had different narrative accounts of how things came about and even different names associated with the Pleroma.1 When Irenaeus wrote, a very influential gnostic teacher was Valentinus, a relatively late arrival on the scene. He had migrated from Alexandria to Rome where he had great influence in the Church, nearly being declared its bishop (Green 110).
In the preface to Book I of Against Heresies, Irenaeus shows a sophisticated understanding of the rhetorical dynamics involved in his task. Playing on the notion of exposure, he says:
Error, indeed, is never set forth in its naked deformity, lest, being thus exposed, it should at once be detected. But it is craftily decked out in an attractive dress, so as, by its outward form, to make it appear to the inexperienced (ridiculous as the expression may seem) more true than the truth itself. (315)
Therefore, he explains that, lest some be carried away because of his neglect, he intends to expose certain men who "are covered in sheep's clothing . . . [whose] language resembles ours, while their sentiments are very different" (315). The purpose of exposing these doctrines is, he says, "to furnish the means of overthrowing them" (316). As J. T. Nielsen, puts it, the object of the treatise is "the exposure ('detectio'. . .) and subversion ('eversio' . . .) of the Gnostic systems (24).
Having alerted his reader to his purpose in the preface or Exordium, Irenaeus, in chapters I through VIII, describes the "absurd ideas of the disciples of Valentinus" (316). This section is a narrative presented as an indirect quotation in third person and serves the function of the classical Narratio.2 For the most part, Irenaeus' presentation of gnostic mythology is a seemingly straight forward recounting of an alien perspective,3 distanced from his own voice with the phrases "they maintain," "they proceed to tell us," and "such then is the account they give" (316-18). Reading this account, if my own experience is at all typical, provides a certain voyeuristic pleasure. Because the mythology is intricate and shrouded in mystery, the reader becomes fascinated with the forbidden teachings now being displayed openly. At the same time, it is clear that these teachings, despite their fascination, are to be held at arm's length.
Although most of chapters I through VIII is a narrative recounting of gnostic mythology and the doctrines which flow from it, Irenaeus also attacks the hermeneutic approach of the Gnostics, thereby making his disposition as one who disapproves clear. At one point, he explains that Gnostics say, "this knowledge [of the Pleroma] has not been openly divulged, because all are not capable of receiving it, but has been mystically revealed by the Saviour through means of parables to those qualified for understanding it" (319). He then tells the reader how Gnostics interpret selected passages of scripture symbolically, claiming, for instance, that the twelfth Aeon is represented by Judas, the twelfth apostle, and by Christ's having suffered in the twelfth month (319).
In Chapter VIII, he turns his full attention to a critique of gnostic hermeneutics. He accuses the gnostics of attempting to adapt the Lord's parables, the sayings of the prophets, and the words of the apostles to their scheme (326). In this chapter, the reader finds himself interpreting Irenaeus, who is interpreting the Gnostics' interpretation of Scripture, which, of course, is an interpretive account of historical events. Because the implied reader is a mature Christian,4 Irenaeus can assume that he knows and supports orthodox interpretations of the scripture passages in question. Therefore, revealing gnostic interpretations of these passages is like inviting the reader to observe a distorted image in a faulty mirror.
Not content to let the examples of faulty interpretation
stand as a simple expose of error, Irenaeus inserts his own
commentary, likening gnostic hermeneutic practice to a deceiver
who took the elements of a king's image, which had been
beautifully fitted together, and reassembled them to make an
image of a dog or fox (326). Showing these reconfigured elements
to people unfamiliar with the king's image, the deceiver is able
to persuade the ignorant. This passage shows, I believe,
Irenaeus' understanding that orthodoxy is not a matter of
citing the scriptiures but rather of accepting the orthodox
pattern of doctrine. As modern philosophers and sociologists of
science point out, theories (from the Greek theoria, meaning to
see or observe) are schematic representations of discrete data
(see Weimer, for instance). They are ways of seeing that draw
lines from da
So far we have seen that Irenaeus presences the words of the
heterodox, but distances himself from them first by stating his
purpose openly in the Preface and second by using third person,
indirect quotations. We have also seen that he signals his
disapproval of the alien words by commenting directly on the
pratice of gnostic hermeneutics. Also within the first eight
chapters, we encounter Irenaeus engaging in overt ridicule, a
strategy that demonstrates the rhetor's confidence in the
superiority of his position. It is sometimes risky to engage in
ridicule, because, if the reader does not recognize the rhetor's
superior position, ridicule magnifies the rhetor's lack of
substance. Furthermore, it is a tactic that works among those
who share the rhetor's orthodoxy but not among those who identify
with the heterodox. Among the heterodox, ridicule of their
position calls forth resentment, further polarizing the groups.
In the fourth chapter of Book I, Irenaeus recounts the
gnostic account of how Achamoth (the passions of Sophia which
were separated from her so that she could remain in the Pleroma)
was formed and, from her disturbances, how the visible world came
into existence. After explaining that Gnostics believe these
passions constitute the "substance of matter from which this
world was formed," (321), Irenaeus says, "what follows from all
this? No light tragedy comes out of it, as the fancy of every man
among them pompously explains." And then, in overt ridicule, he
adds, "I feel somewhat inclined myself to contribute a few hints
towards the development of their system" (321). By playing the
part of a gnostic teacher and spinning out his own theory of how
the passions of Sophia created the world, he makes the entire
system seem ridiculous.
In Chapter XI, he ridicules the Gnostics because they do not
agree on the names of the Aeons in the Pleroma. He characterizes
the evolution of Gnosticism in terms of a series of teachers,
each retelling the stories developed by Simon Magus, but each
making revisions to suit his own desires, even renaming the
Aeons. He again plays the role of a Gnostic teacher, attempting
to define the Aeons:
Taking up the words of the heterodox and remaining faithful to
their content is one thing, but this satirical transforming of
their words is quite another. In the first case, an unveilment
occurs; in the second a kind of adorning. In the above example,
Irenaes adopts the language style and procedure of the Gnostics
but dresses them in new garb, the theory of mellons.
Conclusions
The first Book of Irenaeus' Against Heresies is devoted
almost entirely to recounting gnostic doctrine as taught by
Valentinus and then to showing variations of gnostic doctrine as
taught by other gnostic teachers. I have not attempted to figure
out percentages, but I would not be surprised to find that ninety
to ninety-five percent of Book I is summary and paraphrase of
heterodox teachings. This overwhelming presence of alien words,
however, does not entice the reader; rather, their infectious
power is effectively neutralized by relatively few orthodox
words. By alerting the reader to his purpose, and thereby
placing the heterodox words within an orthodox intentional
context; by marking the words as belonging to the other through
the use of third person indirect quotation; by signalling his own
disapproval of gnostic hermeneutic practice; and by demonstrating
the superiority of his own position through ridicule, Irenaeus
incapsulates the malignant words, making them familiar through
expose, and yet innocuous.
At the end of Book I, as he prepares the reader for Book II,
which contains a summary of orthodox doctrine and, therefore,
serves as a Confirmatio, Irenaeus comments, "since we have
brought their hidden mysteries, which they keep in silence among
themselves, to the light, it will not now be necessary to use
many words in destroying their system of opinions" (358).
Throughout Book I, he has consciously worked to lay open the
doctrines of Gnosticism in their nakedness, claiming that when
the forest is defoliated, the beast can be seen (Grant 134).
Yet, as we saw in the last section, the distinction between
unveiling and adorning is not always clear. Irenaeus' satirical
adornment of Gnostic procedure produces a caricature of the
other.
If it is possible to draw a single overarching conclusion
about this type of rhetorical practice, it seems that it would
have something to do with the process of making the other into a
spectacle. Once the words of the other are appropriated and
recontextualized, they become objects which can be manipulated,
presented in their indefensible nakedness, or dressed in
ridiculous attire. In both cases, the other is made into a
spectacle, one to be gawked at or laughed at, but one
disassociated from the speaker and audience. The other is set on
the stage of epideictic display unwillingly.
Not unlike Jesus, who hung naked as a spectacle for all to see
and to ridicule, the other is set outside the camp and becomes a
recepticle for contempt. Jesus once told a Jewish leader that he
himself would be lifted up as Moses had lifted up the serpent in
the wilderness (John 3:14). If we remember that Moses lifted up
a dead and bronzed serpent so that whoever looked on it would be
healed from the bite of snakes which were plaguing the camp,
perhaps we begin to see Irenaeus, as one who handled serpents,
lifting up a serpent-word, now dead because it had been severed
from the one who spoke it.
Notes
1Part of Irenaeus strategy was to point out the great
variety of accounts in Gnosticism and to contrast these
contradictory accounts with the monolithic account of origins
provided by orthodoxy. See Book I, Chapter X.
2Although Against Heresies has sections which can be
identified as the Confirmatio and the Refutatio, they follow the
section I analyze in this paper, being part of Irenaeus'
subversion strategies rather than his expose strategies.
3As in the case of Plato's dramatic recreation of the
Sophists, there is much discussion among students of Gnosticism
about the distortion of Gnosticism in the heresiological texts.
Vallee says, "We must not expect to find in heresiological
writings 'the truth about the Gnostics'; too often in these
writings the information is tainted by passion or woven within an
alien argument that obscures it" (3-4). I do not have a thorough
enough background in Gnosticism, however, to judge whether
Irenaeus' narrative account is distorted or simply framed within
a hostile context. However Rowan Greer claims that Irenaeus'
assessment of Valentinianism "is very much a caricature" (149).
4It is clear that the implied reader is a mature Christian
who may be called upon to teach the general congregation about
the heresies of Gnosticism. In the Preface to Book I, Irenaeus
addresses the reader as follows: "I do this, in order that thou,
obtaining an acquaintance with these things, mayest in turn
explain them to all those with whom thou art connected, and
exhort them to avoid such an abyss of madness and of blasphemy
against Christ" (315).
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But along with it [a power existing before every other
substance] there exists a power which I term a Gourd; and
along with this Gourd there exists a power which again I
term Utter-Emptiness. This Gourd and Emptiness, since they
are one, produced (and yet did not simply produce, so as to
be apart from themselves) a fruit, everywhere visible,
eatable, and delicious, which fruit-language calls a
Cucumber. Along with this Cucumber exists a power of the
same essence, which again I call a Mellon. These powers,
the Gourd, Utter-Emptiness, the Cucumber, and the Melon,
brought forth the remaining multitude of the delirious
melons of Valentinus. (333)