Any discussion of "epistemic rhetoric" must include the work of Robert L. Scott. His essay, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," which first appeared in the Central States Speech Journal in February, 1967 is seminal work on rhetoric-as-epistemic. I will begin with an examination of Scott's original essay and a brief look at some of his later work. I will also look at how some other theorists have viewed the issue of epistemic rhetoric as it applies to their own theory and follow with a discussion of articles in the Quarterly Journal of Speech's Forum, from 1990, on the demise of Epistemic Rhetoric. This is a selective review primarily of theorists who used epistemic rhetoric in their own work.

Scott's "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," is an essay that attempts to define "truth" in terms of certainty. He cites two types of argument from Stephen Toulmin, analytical and substantial. Only arguments Toulmin defines as analytic can answer the demands of certainty. According to Scott, Toulmin's syllogistic example of an analytic argument:

Anne is Jack's sister; All Jack's sisters have red hair; So Anne has red hair.

Scott discusses the difference between certainty and uncertainty as it applies to life and actions. He argues that one can rarely if ever be certain. If he could then he would have to act on that certainty for failure to act could only be explained "as a sign of momentary misunderstanding or of a flawed intellect." Since one can rarely be certain, one must act with responsibility. Scott continues that, "To act with intentions for good consequences, but to accept the responsibilities for all the consequences in so far as they can be known is part of what being ethical means."

Scott concludes that "at best (or least) truth must be seen as dual: the demands of the precepts one adheres to and the demands of circumstances in which one must act." He continues his discussion by stating that "Man must consider truth not as something fixed and final but as something to be created moment by moment in the circumstances in which he finds himself and with which he must cope." Scott ends the article, "In human affairs, then, rhetoric, perceive in the frame herein discussed, is a way of knowing; it is epistemic." Scott defines epistemology as knowledge. Rhetoric, in the absence of certainty, is a way of knowing, so rhetoric, in Scott's view is epistemic.

Since that first article was published, there has been an onslaught of essays and books discussing rhetoric-as-epistemic from both sides of the argument. The arguments generally seem to take one of two tacks, either the theorist supports the notion of rhetoric as episteme or they accept the idea and look beyond it. No one seems to attempt to totally refute the idea of some epistemic function to rhetoric. The question is often one of definition and purpose.

In 1976, Scott wrote a follow-up essay: "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later." His purpose in writing this essay was primarily to answer three questions that had been asked "numerous times" since the original essay had been published and to clarify to some extent what is meant by episteme. The first question: "Is there one way of knowing or many?" In his answer to this question, Scott argues a pluralistic view of knowing. He argues there are many ways to come to knowledge, some are of a rhetorical nature, but not all. Scott quotes Jean Piaget's comment in "The Epistemology of Interdisciplinary Relationships" that "each discipline sooner or later has to work out its own epistemology." He responds that it is better to concentrate on various ways of knowing than to commit in advance to some architectonic ideal (see McKeon below). He continues that it is better to consider rhetoric as a constituent of any act of knowing rather than all acts of knowing.

The second question: "What sort of knowing does rhetoric seek to achieve?" Scott states that "he claim of knowing rhetorically is that of creating actuality. In this statement he takes the position of the social constructionists that reality is a construct of the knowledge of the community. Creating these realities is not the function of rhetoric alone. Instead of condemning the community to following its traditions, Scott argues that traditions are lived and traditions change because they are lived. According to Scott, "Hans-Georg Godamer (1965) argues that attitudes of science leave experience incompletely understood" Gadamer says, "Experience teaches us to recognize reality. What is properly gained from all experience, then, is to know what is. But 'what is,' here, is not this or that thing, but 'what cannot be done away with...." Scott concludes by saying,"What cannot be done away with in a community is commitment to the norms of that community. Commitment and rhetoric stand in a reciprocal relationship: commitment generates rhetoric and rhetoric generates commitment."

Scott's final question: "Is rhetorical criticism vicious?" This question is based on the idea that to be pluralistic knowledge must be relativistic. Scott is responding to the concerns that relativism makes knowledge unknowable since each individual establishes their own criteria for knowing. Scott argues that rather than unleash chaos on society, relativism forces standards be established and constantly renewed. He continues that this constant renewal requires responsibility on the part of the members.

The purpose of this article is to reaffirm his definition of epistemic rhetoric in terms of tolerance, will, and responsibility. In this article, Scott argues that these values must be considered within the context of the community. To be able to understand the community's social reality and act responsibly within the community is within the scope of rhetoric as epistemic.

The third essay of Scott's is: "Rhetoric is Epistemic: What Difference Does That Make?" (1993). This essay looks at the traditional idea of rhetoric as the art of persuasion, and at Scott's idea of rhetoric as epistemic. Scott here argues that the traditional view of rhetoric as persuasion to a truth is flawed. Plato said that if there is truth and it can be understood by some, what is the purpose of rhetoric? Scott argues that this idea is "the dynamic of an elite." This elite would know the truth and explain it to the masses. Scott's idea of rhetoric-as-epistemic requires human participation in knowing. Knowledge is contingent on the experiences of the community. Scott argues that part of knowing is being committed to what one knows. He argues that commitment is created as knowledge. Scott goes on to define truth or knowledge in a temporal sense. This argument is used to bring the audience and speaker to an even footing. The speaker and the audience open themselves to each other and through an exchange of view come away with an understanding that is different from either's beginning position. Scott prefers to view rhetoric as a force creating truth, "itself dependent on the truths that come with the sense of beginning" neither moving forward in argument or away from argument in reflection.

In the seventeenth century philosophers asked, "How can I know?" Scott says the real question was, "How can I be certain?" He contends "the twentieth century answer to the seventeenth century question is that one cannot be certain. Even in math and physics there is an element of uncertainty creeping into twentieth century study. In this world of uncertainty, Scott says rhetoric has a genuine role. Scott would see truth "as moments of human, creative processes, and rhetoric as finding its being in those processes and those moments.

McKeon's Architectonic Rhetoric (1971) is his vision of a rhetoric that is epistemic in that all disciplines can share understanding and knowledge both within the discipline and between disciplines. At some level that is how we communicate today, how we have always communicated. That is why one can read an account of a medical breakthrough and form an opinion of the knowledge that article recounts. We may not be able to know the details of what the medical breakthrough means, but we can understand what effect that breakthrough will have on our lives.

James A. Berlin added social-epistemic rhetoric to the fray. His was a postmodern look at epistemology and he related to the use of this rhetoric in the classroom. He sees significant postmodern developments falling into three areas: "the status of the subject; the characteristics of signifying practices; and the role of master theories in explaining human affairs." Berlin was most interested in the interaction between speaker and audience. He says the purpose of rhetoric "is to study the production and reception of historically signifying practices." His view of ideology is similar to Scott's later view of knowledge, both are dependent on the interaction of speaker and audience, both address "what exists, what is good, and what is possible."

Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede, in their article "On Distinction between Classical and Modern Rhetoric, redefined the established view of classical rhetoric by attributing an epistemic nature to it. They argued that traditional criticism of Aristotle ignored his philosophical writings. When his philosophy was examined it revealed a much different slant on his writings and on classical rhetoric. They state that the rather than being different classical and modern rhetoric are actually quite similar. Both view man as a language-using animal uniting discourse and reason in discourse. Both rhetoric view rhetoric and audience as coming to "a state of knowing." In both periods rhetoric has the potential enable the sharing of knowledge between different fields (communities).

In The Quarterly Journal of Speech, February, 1990, Barry Brummett wrote an essay on the demise of epistemic rhetoric. In the same issue were two responses, one by Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, the other by Thomas B. Farrell. Cherwitz and Hikins' essay was a refutation of the idea that epistemic rhetoric had died. Farrell's article was a critical analysis that found both articles lacking, not necessarily in the conclusion, but weak in support of their positions.

Brummett's argument is that the discussion of epistemic rhetoric has faded because theorists failed to apply the argument to practical matters such as "actual criticism or 'real life' (however that may be defined) communication." Brummett argues that the focus on rhetorical theory and philosophy at the expense of practical applications doomed the discussion of epistemic rhetoric. He compares the discourse on epistemic rhetoric to a Moslem and a Christian arguing about religion without discussing the specifics of the religion. The discussion degenerates into one theological "'tis-'taint" after another. Brummett likens this to the study of philosophies, that they are "matters of faith grounded in basic premises and belief systems. He complains that the different perspectives in the study of epistemic rhetoric have not concerned with showing "what difference each view makes in how we understand behavior, analyze discourse, or explain the choices made in history." He sees two problems in the direction of the discussion. One, they have not made a difference in controversies in other fields. Two, they have not shown what "specific acts, dimensions, or elements of communication have to do with many of the contentions of rhetorical epistemology." He lament that in the study of philosophy of rhetoric the study of communication has been neglected. He does hope for a new scholar that will come forward to save epistemic rhetoric by application and critical analysis.

Cherwitz and Hikins argue that the flaw in Brummett's eulogy is that praxis can not survive without philosophy. They argue that while criticism will generate and test hypotheses, only a philosophical exploration of rhetoric will help with the definitional, theoretical, and disciplinary issues that define what rhetoric is and can be. Critical analysis of argument will never be the basis for resolution of the issues that face rhetoricians. Only continuing philosophical analysis of epistemological rhetoric will answer the questions of what do as opposed to what they are and how they can be known. Rather than totally reject all of Brummett's argument, they agree that it is important to apply the theory of epistemic rhetoric to written and spoken communication. They conclude that the inquiry of rhetoric as epistemic is not dead, but awaiting rebirth so it can bury the undertakers.

Farrell's response attacks both views. He replies that both essays rely too heavily on the number of essays about epistemic rhetoric appearing in scholarly journals to support their views. He faults Brummett on several fronts. One of his objections is to calling the discussions of epistemic rhetoric "petty manipulations of language games." He cites the work of Toulmin, as well as others as being not the descendents of epistemic rhetoric, but from a stage of discussion of the centrality of rhetorical invention. Farrell's view is that these earlier discussions of inventio were the first to raise the question of what can be known in and through the art of rhetoric. He continues that Brummett is right that the quality of the discourse on epistemic rhetoric has not been resolved the issues raised. He takes offense at the suggestion that rhetoricians should be grounded in the discipline while avoiding the discussion of "some abstraction called 'rhetoric.'" If that were the case, asks Farrell, "To what end are we applying ourselves?" In his response to Cherwitz and Hikins, Farrell agrees with "the fact that Brummett has dismissed rhetoric-as-epistemic from an explicitly epistemic view." His concern is not with the refutation, but with ambiguities in the argument. He disagrees with the notion that "reality is rhetorical construct." He points to the fact that Cherwitz and Hikins do not point to rhetorical analysis as the way to resolve the problems of epistemology, but look for a philosophical analysis. If reality is a rhetorical construct, why can't it resolve its own problems through rhetorical analysis. Farrell suggests, "Rhetoric, at least as interpreted by its traditions, is a collaborative manner of engaging others through discourse so that contingencies may be resolved, judgments rendered, action produced." His objection to Brummett and to Cherwitz and Hikins is that they think of rhetoric as something that theorists and critics do rather than its traditional purpose.

In the August 1990, Quarterly Journal of Speech, Scott responded to the discussion in the Forum. He argues that Brummett and Farrell have missed the point of epistemic rhetoric. His idea of epistemic rhetoric is not a search for certainty but knowing. It is not a recipe for criticism, but a tool that may be brought forward if needed. Scott agrees that the dispute over epistemic rhetoric should not divide theory and practice.

The issues raised by the discussions of epistemic rhetoric are based on the definition of knowledge. Is knowledge and truth the same as Scott seems to say in some of his work? Is knowledge something we know from consensus, as the poststructuralists argue. When Scott defines episteme as knowledge and understanding, he helps to overcome some objections to the idea that rhetoric defines truth. I would agree that epistemic rhetoric is the sharing of knowledge. I do have problems with the idea of constructing truth as a goal of rhetoric. I have a need to separate truth from knowledge because I feel that at some level there is truth, and the search for knowledge is what leads us in the direction of truth. I have a few other observations about rhetoric as epistemic that I have formulated during my reading.

It is impossible to communicate without sharing knowledge. All forms of communication, from body language to the most sophisticated discourse, has as its base, the need to share some knowledge. Whether questioning or answering, speaker or audience, information is shared and with that information goes knowledge.

Is knowledge different for everyone (every community), if so what is the purpose of rhetoric and what does rhetoric accomplish? The difficulty in viewing rhetoric as epistemic is compounded by different symbols (words) used by different communities (groups of people with some common symbols) as long as the symbols have the same meanings people can share knowledge easily. When the symbols are different or have different meanings, the second part of the definition of episteme (understanding) is required. When understanding between communities is achieved, they can share their knowledge (consensus). The reason different communities are able to discuss anything is that they have some symbols which are shared and effort has been made to understand the non-shared symbols.

The rhetorician offers up what he think he knows. It is up to the audience to accept or reject it, based on their own life experiences and prejudices, to sift out what they can use, apply that to their own life and reject the rest.

As long as there is communication , the purpose of rhetoric will be epistemic. It may not always be called epistemic rhetoric, but the search for valid ways to discuss knowledge and how it is acquired and shared will continue.

While the dialog has taken new and different directions, there is still a great difference among theoricians in the area of epistemic rhetoric. The discussion promises to continue in some form for quite some time.

Sources:

Berlin, James A. "Poststructuralism, Cultured Studies, and the Composition Classroom: Postmodern Theory in Practice." Professing the New Rhetoric. Ed. Theresa Enos and Stuart C. Brown. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994. 461-480.

Brummett, Barry. " The Reported Demise of Epistemic Rhetoric: A Eulogy for Epistemic Rhetoric. The Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (Feb. 1990): 69-72.

Cherwitz, Robert A. and Hikins, James W. "Burying the Undertaker: A Eulogy for the Eulogists of Rhetorical Epistemology. The Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (Feb. 1990): 73-77.

---. "Why the Epistemic in Epistemic Rhetoric? The Paradox of Rhetoric as Performance." Text and Performance Quarterly 15 (1995): 189-205.

Farrell, Thomas B. "From the Parthenon to the Bassinet: Death and Rebirth Along the Epistemic Trail. The Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (Feb. 1990): 78-84.

Lunsford, Andrea A. and Ede, Lisa S. "On Distinctions between Classical and Modern Rhetoric." Professing the New Rhetoric. Ed. Theresa Enos and Stuart C. Brown. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994. 397-411

McKeon, Richard. "The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age: Architectonic Productive Arts." Professing the New Rhetoric. Ed. Theresa Enos and Stuart C. Brown. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994. 126-144.

Scott, Robert L. "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic." Central States Speech Journal 18 (1967): 9-16.

---. "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later. Central States Speech Journal 27 (1976): 258-266.

---. "Epistemic Rhetoric and Criticism: Where Barry Brummett Goes Wrong." The Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1990): 300-303.

---. "Rhetoric as Epistemic: What Difference Does That Make?" Defining the New Rhetorics. Ed. Theresa Enos and Stuart C. Brown. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994. 120-136.